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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by Dr. Gideon Goldstein fr om the 
adverse judgment of the District Court in favor of his 
former employer, Johnson & Johnson (J&J), following a 
bench trial. It requires us to addr ess again the question of 
the proper scope of judicial review of the decision of a plan 
administrator acting under the Employee Retir ement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. S 1001 et 
seq., to deny benefits to a participant. Although this topic 
has been exhaustively examined in the context of benefits 
denials generally, see Firestone T ire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101 (1989), and in the context of decisions made 
by potentially self-interested administrators specifically, see 
Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377 (3d 
Cir. 2000), we now face a benefits-denial decision in a new 
context: that of a "top hat" plan, i.e., a"plan which is 
unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily for 
the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select 
group of management or highly trained employees." Miller v. 
Eichleay Eng'rs, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 34 n.8 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citations omitted). 
 
In Firestone Tire, the Supreme Court explained that 
because ERISA plans are analogous to "trusts" for 
employees, with the plan administrator serving as trustee, 
a reviewing court owes deference to the discretionary 
decisions of the administrator just as the discr etionary 
decisions of a trustee would receive defer ence. See Firestone 
Tire, 489 U.S. at 111. In Pinto, we interpreted Firestone Tire 
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to mandate a more searching scrutiny of such discretionary 
decisions in situations where the impartiality of the 
administrator is called into question, either because the 
structure of the plan itself inherently cr eates a conflict of 
interest, or because the beneficiary has put forth specific 
evidence of bias or bad faith in his or her particular case. 
See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 383-87. However, both Firestone Tire 
and Pinto are premised on the analogy of an ERISA plan to 
a traditional trust. 
 
In contrast, this Court has routinely tr eated top hat 
plans differently from other kinds of plans. See, e.g., In re 
New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(explaining differences between top hat plans and other 
ERISA plans). This is because top hat plans ar e expressly 
exempted from most of the substantive ERISA r equirements 
normally employed to protect workers' interests in their 
plans. See 29 U.S.C. SS 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1). Top 
hat plans are unfunded, they do not vest, and they are not 
required to name fiduciaries. See id. Under such 
circumstances, the analogy to trust law fails, and the plans 
are more appropriately consider ed as unilateral contracts, 
whereby neither party's interpretation is entitled to any 
more "deference" than the other party's. See In re New 
Valley, 89 F.3d at 149 (top hat plans are governed by the 
federal common law of contract); Kemmerer v. ICI Americas 
Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). 
 
There appears to be no reason, however , why the 
precondition that mandates deference in the context of the 
more typical ERISA plan -- that is, a written clause 
explicitly granting authority to the plan administrator to 
interpret the terms of the plan, see Firestone Tire, 489 U.S. 
at 111-12 -- should not be given effect as part of the 
unilateral contract that constitutes a top hat plan. In 
accordance with ordinary contract principles, we conclude 
that, depending on the language used, such a clause has 
the potential to grant the plan administrator discr etion to 
construe the terms of the plan, subject to the implied duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts S 205. And, as with any other contract term, 
courts retain the authority to review the administrator's 
compliance with that duty to exercise discr etion in good 
faith. 
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The dispute in this case centers around the pr oper 
characterization of an unusual form of compensation that 
Goldstein received during his tenure at J&J. The question 
is whether this compensation, which involved paying to 
Goldstein a specified percentage of the sales of products he 
developed, should have been taken into account for the 
purpose of determining his monthly pension under the 
terms of J&J's retirement plans. Goldstein argues that 
these payments should have been used to calculate his 
pension; the plan administrator disagrees. Her e, the grant 
of discretion to the plan administrator to interpret the 
plan's terms was broad, in that the administrator was given 
"sole authority" to "[i]nterpret the provisions" of the plan, 
and the administrator's actions were to be"final and 
conclusive for all persons." Moreover , the District Court's 
factual conclusion that the administrator at all times acted 
in good faith with respect to the employee's claim for 
benefits is not clearly erroneous. Accor dingly, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court denying Goldstein's 




Goldstein is a physician who specializes in 
immunobiology research, specifically AIDS research. In 
1977, Goldstein, then employed by the Sloan-Kettering 
Institute for Cancer Research, received a patent on the drug 
thymopentin, which he assigned to his employer . Later that 
year, he joined Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, a 
subsidiary of J&J. Ortho licensed the thymopentin patent 
from Sloan-Kettering to allow Goldstein to continue his 
work, paying a royalty for the license based on sales, and 




1. The employment contracts consistently r efer to these payments as 
"commissions"; however, the parties dispute whether they were truly 
"commissions" or were instead "r oyalties." For the purposes of this 
opinion, we will follow the contractual language and refer to the 
payments as "commissions," although our use of the term is not 
intended to imply a legal conclusion as to the pr oper characterization of 
the payments. 
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In 1987, J&J created the Immunobiology Resear ch 
Institute, headed by Goldstein. At that time, Goldstein 
entered into a new employment contract with J&J. This 
new contract contained a section titled "Compensation," 
with three subheadings. The first subheading,"Salary, 
Bonus and Employee Benefits" explained that Goldstein 
would receive a "salary and cash bonus each year," and 
would be "entitled to participate in all general employee 
benefit plans . . . in accordance with their terms, including 
. . . retirement plans." The second subheading, 
"Commissions," provided that in addition to his salary, 
Goldstein would receive a commission equal to one and 
one-fourth percent of the sales of the pr oducts he 
developed. The commissions would continue at a r educed 
rate for five years after the expiration of the patents, 
irrespective of Goldstein's continued employment with J&J. 
The agreement also provided that J&J was under no 
obligation to market Goldstein's products, and that the 
salary and bonus payments were to be paid "in lieu of " that 
obligation. The third subheading stated that Goldstein 
would not participate in J&J's executive stock bonus plan, 
a provision to which Goldstein had agreed in exchange for 
the right to receive commissions. As it happened, 
throughout Goldstein's relationship with J&J, the only 
patent that was actually marketed -- and thus, the only 
patent that generated income to Goldstein -- was the 
thymopentin patent. Despite this fact, Goldstein's 
commissions greatly exceeded his salary and bonus 
payments, constituting almost 75% of his total 
compensation. 
 
Throughout Goldstein's tenure with J&J, the company 
maintained a system of retirement benefits for its 
employees, consisting of two interrelated plans (together, 
"the Plan"). The first was an ordinary funded pension plan 
(the Retirement Plan), subject to all of ERISA's substantive 
requirements. Under this plan, retir ees would receive 
monthly benefits in an amount determined by a formula 
based on the average compensation earned by the employee 
during his or her five highest consecutive ear ning years 
with the company. The amount of these payments was 
capped in order for the plan to maintain its qualified status 
under the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. S 415. In 
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addition to its Retirement Plan, J&J also maintained what 
it termed an "Excess Benefit Plan" (the Top Hat Plan) 
designed to work in tandem with the Retirement Plan.2 The 
Top Hat Plan paid out the benefits due an employee under 
J&J's pension formula that, due to the cap, could not be 
paid directly from the Retirement Plan. 
 
Both plans were administered by a Pension Committee. 
Under the terms of the Retirement Plan, the Pension 
Committee was granted "sole authority" to"interpret" the 
terms of the plan. Under the terms of the Top Hat Plan, 
benefits would be calculated according to the terms of the 
Retirement Plan, and the "decisions made by and the 
actions taken by [the Pension Committee] in the 
administration of this Excess Plan shall be final and 
conclusive for all persons." By early 1995, the Committee 
had delegated much of its authority to interpr et the Plan to 
a subcommittee known as the Benefits Claims Committee 
(BCC). The Pension Committee was the named fiduciary of 
the Retirement Plan. However, the T op Hat Plan was, by 
definition, unfunded (i.e., benefits wer e paid directly out of 
J&J's operating revenues), and its administrator not only 
had no fiduciary responsibilities, but was also explicitly 
exempted from personal liability for actions taken with 
respect to the plan. Obviously, both the lack of fiduciary 
responsibility and the exemption from personal liability 
would not have been possible had the excess benefit plan 
been subject to ERISA's general requirements. See In re 
New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Because benefits under the Plan were deter mined by 
reference to the employee's compensation during his or her 
employment with J&J, it was necessary for the Plan to 
define the types of compensation that would be included in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. ERISA provides that plans designed solely to provide benefits in excess 
of the statutory cap contained in 26 U.S.C. S 415 are "excess benefit 
plans" that are not covered by ERISA at all. See 29 U.S.C. S 1002(36); 
Gamble v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 38 F.3d 126, 128 (4th 
Cir. 1994). However, despite the fact that J&J styled this an "Excess 
Benefit Plan," we determined on a pr evious appeal that the plan was, in 
fact, a top hat plan, and thus governed by ERISA. See Goldstein v. 
Johnson & Johnson, No. 98-6065 & 98-6172, slip op. at 10 (3d Cir. Mar. 
4, 1999). 
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the benefit calculation. Throughout Goldstein's employment 
with J&J, the relevant Plan provisions explained that: 
 
       "Covered Compensation" means basic r emuneration 
       paid to an Employee including amounts deferr ed at the 
       Employee's election under the Johnson & Johnson 
       Savings Plan, during periods for which such Employee 
       receives Credited Service under this Plan. Covered 
       Compensation for a year includes straight time pay for 
       a regular workweek, prior year salesman's 
       commissions and other specified forms of incentive 
       compensation, and incentive or piecework ear nings, 
       but excludes premiums for overtime shift, Satur day 
       and Sunday (6th or 7th workday) or holiday work, 
       arbitrary bonuses, the value of gifts, management 
       incentive bonuses and certificates of extra 
       compensation.3 
 
In addition, the Summary Plan Description explained that: 
 
       Included in your Plan earnings will be your straight 
       time pay for your regular workweek, sales-person's 
       commissions, overtime, shift differential, year-end cash 
       Christmas gift, and year-end executive cash bonus. All 
       other earnings, for example, Johnson & Johnson 
       Achievement Award and stock, not specifically 
       described above, are not included in Plan earnings. 
 
In December 1994, J&J modified its plan, r etroactive to 
1989. In this new version of the plan, the definition of 
"compensation" was rewritten as: 
 
       "Covered Compensation" means basic r emuneration 
       paid to an Employee including amounts deferr ed at the 
       Employee's election under the Johnson & Johnson 
       Savings Plan and salary reduction amounts under a 
       plan that meets the requirements of Section 125 of the 
       Code, during periods for which such Employee r eceives 
       Credited Service under this Plan. Cover ed 
       Compensation for a year includes straight time pay for 
       a regular workweek, current year salesperson's paid 
       commissions, other specified forms of incentive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. These Certificates of Extra Compensation, or CECs, were the 
functional equivalent of a share of stock. 
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       compensation and incentive or piecework earnings, 
       year-end cash Christmas gift, year-end cash executive 
       bonus, overtime, shift, Saturday and Sunday (6th or 
       7th workday), and holiday pay. . . . Covered 
       Compensation shall include the annual value of stock 
       contract awards and dividend equivalents paid on 
       unissued stock contract shares and, if applicable, non- 
       vested Certificates of Extra Compensation (CECs). 
 
The new Summary Plan Description defined "Plan 
Earnings" as: 
 
       Compensation used in determining Pension Plan 
       benefits, including consideration of straight-time pay 
       for your regular workweek, salesperson's commissions, 
       overtime, shift differential, year -end cash gift, year-end 
       executive cash bonus, the value of delivered r estricted 
       stock awards and dividend equivalents paid on 
       undelivered restricted stock awards, dividend 
       equivalents paid on non vested CEC units, and sales 
       management incentive compensation. 
 
As the quote demonstrates, this new Summary Plan 
Description no longer contained the sentence excluding 
forms of compensation not otherwise specified. 
 
Just before the changes to the 1994 Plan wer e enacted, 
Goldstein retired from J&J and began to receive his 
pension under the terms of the Retirement Plan and the 
Top Hat Plan. At this time, J&J and Goldstein also began 
to negotiate a severance. Discussions continued until April 
1996, mostly focusing on the disposition of the intellectual 
property rights to the research Goldstein had conducted 
during his tenure. Eventually, an Agreement and Mutual 
Release was signed by both parties (Release). The Release 
provided that all claims by Goldstein r egarding "the 
Employment Agreement, the termination of said agreement 
. . . illegal discrimination, harassment or r etaliation based 
on age, sex, race, religion, national origin, citizenship, 
disability . . . breach of contract, br each of promise . . . 
wrongful denial of benefits . . . ." wer e waived; however, the 
Release expressly preserved "Goldstein's right to participate 
in J&J's Retirement Plan . . . in accor dance with the terms 
of said plan." Both provisions were added in response to a 
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request by Goldstein's attorney that Goldstein be permitted 
to participate in the pension plans. 
 
The day after the Release was signed, Goldstein 
telephoned Efrem Dlugacz, a member of the Pension 
Committee, to protest the calculation of his pension 
benefits. Specifically, Goldstein objected to the fact that the 
"compensation" used to compute his pension did not 
include the commissions he had earned on the 
thymopentin patent, but rather were based solely on his 
salary and annual bonuses. Goldstein was then r eceiving a 
pension of $7,606 per month; had his commissions been 
included, his pension would have been $30,126 per month. 
Goldstein admits that at the time he executed the Release, 
he was aware of his intention to challenge the calculation 
of his pension. All of the extra benefits claimed by Goldstein 
would have been paid out of the Top Hat Plan. 
 
On Dlugacz's suggestion, Goldstein lodged his objections 
in writing. Garry Goldberg, Manager of Pension 
Administration, having reviewed Goldstein's claim, 
addressed a memo to the BCC taking the position that 
Goldstein's commissions were not pensionable. Considering 
only whether Goldstein's commissions fell into one of the 
categories of specifically enumerated pensionable items, 
Goldberg concluded that the only potentially r elevant 
categories were "salesperson's commissions" and "sales 
management incentive compensation," but that these items 
only referred to the compensation r eceived by salespeople. 
Under this interpretation, Goldstein's ear nings did not 
qualify. Goldstein was not given a copy of this memo or 
asked to respond. 
 
With Goldstein's knowledge, the BCC met in May 1996 to 
consider his claims. In June of that year, Michael J. Carey, 
Chair of the BCC, wrote to Goldstein denying his claim, on 
the ground that Goldstein was not a salesperson and that 
the commissions were not "incentive compensation" as that 
term was used in the definition of "Cover ed Compensation." 
Letters were exchanged in which Goldstein ar gued that his 
commissions were, in fact, covered under the Plan because 
his commissions were "incentive or piecework earnings." 
Carey maintained the position that the ter m "incentive or 
piecework earnings" was intended to apply to production 
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employees who exceeded their quotas, and that any type of 
earnings not explicitly mentioned in the 1994 definition of 
"Covered Compensation" was not pensionable. Goldstein 
began threatening to sue in September 1996, and shortly 
thereafter, the Pension Committee met and an attorney in 
the Tax Department, Robert Keefer,"presented" Goldstein's 
claim. After considering the evidence and the 
correspondence that had been exchanged, the Pension 
Committee agreed that the BCC's determination that 
Goldstein's commissions were not "cover ed compensation" 
was "appropriate." 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
In October 1996, Goldstein filed suit against J&J in New 
Jersey Superior Court for the additional benefits under 29 
U.S.C. S 1132, ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. J&J 
removed to the District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
and that court granted summary judgment to J&J on the 
ground that the Release included all claims Goldstein had 
against J&J for further pension benefits. On appeal, we 
vacated the judgment and remanded to the District Court, 
holding that the Release was ambiguous as to its scope and 
thus there could be no judgment as a matter of law based 
upon it. See Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 98-6065 
& 98-6172 (3d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999). 
 
The District Court then held a bench trial in which 
Goldstein claimed that his commissions were covered under 
the Plan, either as "salesperson's commissions" or "sales 
management incentive compensation," or because the items 
included on the list of pensionable compensation wer e 
meant only as exemplars of the general category of"basic 
remuneration," into which his commissions fell. J&J 
defended on the ground that the Plan, by its terms, did not 
cover Goldstein's commissions, and further that the 
interpretation of the Plan offered by the Plan administrators 
was deserving of deference under Firestone Tire.4 The case 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. J&J also argued that Goldstein had agr eed in the Release to waive 
these claims against J&J, and that even if the Release did not cover 
these particular claims, Goldstein's failure to mention his intention to 
sue for greater benefits during the negotiations should estop him from 
asserting his claims at this time. The District Court did not find it 
necessary to reach these alternative ar guments, and, given our 
disposition, neither do we. 
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was tried prior to our decision in Pinto v. Reliance Standard 
Life Insurance Co., 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir . 2000), and the 
District Court reviewed the determination of the BCC de 
novo, concluding that Goldstein's commissions wer e not 
"Covered Compensation" as that phrase was used in the 
Plan. Further, the court found that J&J had r eviewed 
Goldstein's claim in good faith. See Goldstein v. Johnson & 
Johnson, No. 96-5643, slip op. at 22-23 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 
2000) ("[T]he Court finds as a fact that the Johnson & 
Johnson Benefits Claims Committee and the Pension 
Committee . . . exerted their best efforts accurately to 
interpret the plan and fairly to adjudicate Goldstein's claim, 
uninfluenced by whether these benefits would have been 
paid directly by Johnson & Johnson . . . .").5 Accordingly, 
the court entered judgment for J&J. Goldstein now appeals. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We have plenary review over 
a district court's conclusions of law, and we r eview its 




A. Standard of Review of a Plan Administrator's 
       Interpretations  
 
ERISA was enacted to ensure that employer -provided 
benefit plans are safeguarded and maintained so as to be 
available to employees when they are due. The Act does not 
mandate that an employer provide benefits, and has 
nothing to say about how these plans are to be designed. 
See Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1329 (3d Cir. 1991). 
The Act does, however, ordinarily imposefiduciary duties 
upon plan administrators once a plan has been 
implemented. See Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp. , 188 
F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
Administrators of ERISA plans may have various degr ees 
of responsibility, depending on the plan's design. Some may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We recognize that the court did not use the term of art "good faith" in 
its opinion; however, we do not believe that the quoted statements can 
be interpreted as anything other than a finding of good faith. 
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be charged simply with carrying out the plan according to 
its terms; others may have more discr etionary authority to 
interpret the terms of the Plan and make benefits 
determinations. See Firestone T ire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101 (1989). For many years, in cases in which 
beneficiaries sued administrators alleging that benefits had 
been wrongly denied them, courts attempted to set 
standards as to the degree to which they would defer to the 
decisions of the administrators who, by the design of the 
plan -- which the employer was completely fr ee to set -- 
were charged with implementing it. 
 
In Firestone Tire, the issue finally reached the Supreme 
Court. Firestone Tire had sold its plastics division to a new 
company, and the former employees, who had been rehired 
without interruption and at the same pay rates, sued 
Firestone for the benefits they had accrued under 
Firestone's termination pay plan. Fir estone, which was also 
the administrator of the plan, denied the benefits on the 
ground that the sale to the new company did not constitute 
a triggering event within the terms of the plan requiring the 
payment of benefits. See id. at 105-06. In determining the 
appropriate standard of review to apply to Firestone's 
interpretation of its plan, the Supreme Court began by 
observing that "ERISA abounds with the language and 
terminology of trust law." Id. at 110. The Court, particularly 
noting that ERISA requires that benefits plans have named 
fiduciaries and authorizes suits against them for breach of 
fiduciary duty, see id., analogized ERISA administrators to 
trustees, and explained that in setting a standar d of review 
for an administrator's decision, it would follow or dinary 
principles of trust law, see id. at 111. 
 
In the Court's view, under ERISA, an administrator is a 
fiduciary "to the extent he exercises any discretionary 
authority or control." Id. at 113 (emphasis omitted). Under 
ordinary trust principles, the decisions of trustees who are 
granted discretionary authority to interpr et the trust's 
terms receive only arbitrary and capricious review from 
courts. See id. at 111. Extending these principles to ERISA, 
the Court held that although the decisions of these 
fiduciaries of ERISA plans would receive deferential review 
from courts, administrators who were not granted 
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discretionary authority to construe a plan's terms would 
receive no deference, and their decisions would be reviewed 
in accordance with ordinary contract principles. See id. at 
111-15. The Court also left open the possibility that ERISA 
fiduciaries operating under a conflict of inter est would 
receive less deferential review. See id. at 115. Under our 
decision in Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 
214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000), a court will apply heightened 
scrutiny to an administrator's determination either when 
the plan, by its very design, creates a special danger of a 
conflict of interest, or when the beneficiary can point to 
evidence of specific facts calling the impartiality of the 
administrator into question. See id. at 383-87; see also Bill 
Gray Enters., Inc. Employee Health & Welfar e Benefit Plan v. 
Gourley, Nos. 00-3412 & 00-1400, 2001 WL 427626, slip 
op. at 15 (3d Cir. Apr. 26, 2001). 
 
If J&J's Plan were an ordinary ERISA plan, then, given 
the broad discretion granted to the Pension Committee, we 
would apply the standards set forth in Fir estone Tire and 
Pinto. We would first determine whether any conflict of 
interest existed for the Plan administrators, and then we 
would calibrate our standard of review for their benefits 
decision accordingly. Because Goldstein's claim for benefits 
would be paid entirely out of the Top Hat Plan and the 
funds would come directly from J&J's operating revenues, 
we perforce would consider these facts r elevant in choosing 
our standard of review. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 389. 
 
However, a top hat plan is a unique animal under 
ERISA's provisions. These plans are intended to 
compensate only highly-paid executives, and the 
Department of Labor has expressed the view that such 
employees are in a strong bargaining position relative to 
their employers and thus do not require the same 
substantive protections that are necessary for other 
employees. See DOL Opin. Letter 90-14 A, 1990 WL 
123933, at *1 (May 8, 1990). We have held that such plans 
are more akin to unilateral contracts than to the trust-like 
structure normally found in ERISA plans. See In re New 
Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996); Kemmerer v. 
ICI Americas Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Accordingly, top hat plans are not subject to any of ERISA's 
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substantive provisions, including its r equirements for 
vesting and funding. See 29 U.S.C. SS 1051(2); 1081(a)(3). 
Not only are the administrators of these plans not subject 
to ERISA's fiduciary requirements, see 29 U.S.C. S 1101(a), 
but the top hat plan at issue in this case specifically 
exempts its administrators from any personal liability for 
actions taken with regard to the plan. 
 
Given the unique nature of top hat plans, we believe the 
holding of Firestone Tire requiring deferential review forthe 
discretionary decisions of administrators to be inapplicable. 
The deferential standard of review granted to plan 
administrators exercising discretionary authority was 
specifically an outgrowth of the Supr eme Court's analogy to 
trust law, and particularly the fiduciary r esponsibilities 
possessed by administrators with discretionary authority. 
See Firestone Tire, 489 U.S. at 110-11. In contrast, a top 
hat administrator has no fiduciary responsibilities. Top 
hats are more analogous to the second scenario identified 
by the Supreme Court, i.e., when a plan administrator has 
no discretion to interpret the plan's ter ms (and thus is not 
a fiduciary), in which case the plan is reviewed de novo, 
according to the federal common law of contract. See id. at 
112. That is, although, as was done in this case, 
"discretion" may be explicitly written into a top hat plan 
document, it does not act as a legal trigger altering the 
standard of review. Thus, we believe that, in accordance 
with our earlier precedent, top hat plans should be treated 
as unilateral contracts, and neither party's interpr etation 
should be given precedence over the other's, except in 
accordance with ordinary contract principles.6 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we reject J&J's contention 
that, because ERISA's definitional section lists a"fiduciary" 
as one who exercises discretion in interpr eting the terms of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We are aware that other courts have applied Firestone Tire's holding to 
top hat plans. See, e.g., Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 187 F.3d 599, 604 
(7th Cir. 1999); Schikore v. BankAmerica Supplemental Retirement Plan, 
No. C 98-3857 SI, 1999 WL 605826 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1999). However, 
these cases do not explicitly question whether Firestone Tire should be 
so freely transferrable, and, in fact, in at least one instance, the court 
specifically "deferred" to the administrator of a top hat plan on the 
basis 
that the administrator was a fiduciary. See Olander, 187 F.3d at 607. 
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a plan, see 29 U.S.C. S 1002(21)(a), administrators of top 
hat plans are also fiduciaries. To begin with, ERISA 
explicitly states that top hat plans are not subject to the 
ERISA's fiduciary requirements. See  29 U.S.C. S 1101(a). 
Further, it is well established in the caselaw that there is 
no cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty involving a 
top hat plan. See In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d at 153; 
accord Demery v. Extebank Compensation Plan , 216 F.3d 
283, 290 (2d Cir. 2000) (dismissing ERISA claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty in a top hat plan on the ground 
that top hat administrators are not bound byfiduciary 
standards); Duggan v. Hobbs, 99 F .3d 307, 313 (9th Cir. 
1996) (same). Finally, we find J&J's argument disingenuous 
in light of the explicit terms of its own Plan absolving the 
administrators of the Top Hat Plan from individual liability. 
These terms, which designate the Pension Committee as 
"administrator" (but not fiduciary), stand in marked 
contrast to the parallel provisions of the Retirement Plan 
that explicitly name the same committee both as 
administrator and as fiduciary. 
 
We acknowledge that our holding may appear to have the 
potential to create anomalous results. T o begin with, many 
plans may be structured as the one curr ently before us, 
whereby benefits are calculated in a similar manner 
whether they are to be paid from an or dinary retirement 
plan or from a top hat plan. Differ ent standards of review 
for each may result in different interpretations of a single 
plan's terms, even though on paper the two halves are 
designed to work in tandem and to yield identical r esults. 
Our holding may also seem anomalous in that we appear to 
be according the least deference to plan administrators 
when they are determining benefits of highly-paid 
employees, the very group that the Department of Labor 
believes is best able to protect its own inter ests. 
 
However, we believe that these potentially anomalous 
results are not as severe as may appear at first blush. The 
"deference" ordinarily due an ERISA plan administrator is 
only available to the extent that the plan grants that 
administrator discretion to interpret the terms of the plan. 
See Firestone Tire, 489 U.S. at 111-13. In the absence of 
such discretion, a court will review the terms of the plan de 
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novo. See id. Thus, the possibility for dif ferent standards of 
review between top hat plans and other ERISA plans will 
only arise when the plan has explicitly granted discretion to 
the plan administrators. But in the case of a top hat plan, 
even though an administrator may not receive"deference" 
under Firestone Tire, any grant of discretion must be read 
as part of the unilateral contract itself. As a ter m of the 
contract, it must be given effect as or dinary contract 
principles would require, thus minimizing the potential for 
differing standards of review for identical plan terms. 
 
Ordinary contract principles requir e that, where one 
party is granted discretion under the ter ms of the contract, 
that discretion must be exercised in good faith -- a 
requirement that includes the duty to exer cise the 
discretion reasonably. See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts S 205 & cmt a; see also Ber ger v. Edgewater Steel 
Co., 911 F.2d 911, 919 (3d Cir. 1990) (term of an ERISA 
retirement plan allowing early retir ement when "the 
Company considers that such retirement would . . . be in 
its interest" obligates the employer to r each its decision in 
good faith). As with any other contract term, courts retain 
the authority to conduct a de novo review as to whether a 
party has complied with its good-faith obligations. 
 
Goldstein argues that if the plan is a traditional contract, 
the clause granting interpretive discretion to J&J 
administrators should be voided as unconscionable for it is 
the functional equivalent of designating an inter ested party 
as an arbitrator. We do not agr ee. Contracts are often 
considered to be enforceable even when particular parties 
are able to specify terms in the course of dealing, subject 
only to the duty of good faith. See, e.g., O.N. Jonas Co., Inc. 
v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code); TCP Indus., 
Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1981) (same). 
Goldstein has cited nothing to the contrary, and we do not 
consider cases involving due process rights to impartial 
arbitrators, such as United Retail & Wholesale Employees 
Teamsters Union Local No. 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn & 
McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir . 1986), to be apposite 
to the issue at hand. Thus, we see nothing impr oper in 
Goldstein and J&J contracting to allow Goldstein to 
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participate in a pension plan under which J&J will have 
responsibility to administer the plan and interpret 
ambiguous terms, so long as its interpr etations are 
reasonable and it exercises its responsibilities in good faith. 
In fact, given that the Top Hat Plan was designed to work 
in concert with a retirement plan that has designated the 
same entity as the fiduciary (a perfectly legitimate design), 
the Top Hat Plan could hardly be administered effectively 
without granting J&J this discretion. 
 
B. Interpreting the Ter ms of J&J's Top Hat Plan 
 
The District Court concluded, and Goldstein has not 
disputed, that under the language of the Plan documents 
the Pension Committee was given broad authority to 
interpret the terms of the Plan and to make final decisions 
with regard to the payment of benefits. 7 Nonetheless, 
Goldstein disputes the Committee's interpretation of 
whether his commissions constituted pensionable 
compensation, although, as we explained in the r ecitation 
of facts, his argument as to how his commissions fall under 
the definition of "Covered Compensation" has taken a 
variety of forms over the course of this dispute.8 As it is 
currently presented to us, Goldstein's claim is that, 
although his commissions were not cover ed under the 1989 
version of the Plan, the 1994 changes to the Plan, in 
particular the deletion of the statement that "All other 
earnings . . . not specifically described above, are not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As described above, the Retirement Plan stated that the Pension 
Committee had "sole authority" to "interpr et" the plan's terms; the Top 
Hat Plan incorporated this discretion by r eference when it explained that 
benefits would be calculated in accordance with the terms of the 
Retirement Plan. The Top Hat Plan also added a provision that the 
Pension Committee's decisions in the administration of the Top Hat Plan 
would be "final and conclusive." 
 
8. Goldstein originally argued that his commissions were pensionable as 
"incentive or piecework earnings." Later , he claimed that his 
commissions were "salesperson's commissions" or "sales management 
incentive compensation," or, in the alter native, that the commissions 
were "basic remuneration," and that the items enumerated as "basic 
remuneration" in the Plan were only meant as examples of the types of 
payments that were pensionable. 
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included in Plan earnings," suggests that the phrase "basic 
remuneration" was given a broader definition in 1994. In 
Goldstein's view, the 1994 Plan's list of pensionable items 
was intended merely to provide examples of the type of 
compensation covered; because Goldstein's commissions 
constituted 75% of his earnings, he maintains that the 
commissions were, in fact, his "basic r emuneration," and 
therefore are pensionable under the terms of the 1994 Plan. 
 
J&J responds that the list of pensionable ear nings was 
intended as an exclusive list of all covered items, and that 
because Goldstein's commissions were not included in the 
list, they are therefore not pensionable. As explained above, 
the question presented to the Court is not whether J&J's 
interpretation offers the best reading of the contract; 
rather, given the discretion granted to the Pension 
Committee, the question is whether the interpr etation 
offered by J&J was reached in good faith. The District 
Court, after listening to the testimony of the parties and 
examining the documentary evidence, concluded that J&J's 
interpretation of the terms of its Plan was reasonable, and 
that J&J administrators had used their "best ef forts" to 
interpret the Plan accurately and fairly to assess 
Goldstein's claim. The District Court's findings are not 
clearly erroneous. 
 
In reaching its conclusions, the court first relied on its 
assessment of the credibility of J&J's plan administrators, 
and specifically found that the members of the Pension 
Committee and the BCC were not biased in their decisions, 
and had "exerted their best efforts accurately to interpret 
the plan and fairly to adjudicate Goldstein's claim." It is 
axiomatic that we defer to a district court's cr edibility 
determinations. 
 
Further, we find no fault with the District Court's 
determination that the numerous "irr egularities" identified 
by Goldstein in the process by which the administrators 
interpreted the Plan do not give rise to an inference of bias 
or bad faith. These alleged irregularities r elate first to the 
manner by which the Pension Committee delegated its 
responsibilities to the BCC, and second to what Goldstein 
perceives as the lack of opportunities for him to present 
arguments and evidence on his behalf. 
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Goldstein begins by submitting that the Pension 
Committee never formally delegated authority to the BCC to 
make benefits determinations, and ther efore its decision to 
"rubber stamp" the BCC decision without r eaching its own 
independent conclusions rendered its interpretation of the 
Plan terms nugatory. It is true that courts have refused to 
accord Firestone Tire  deference to the decisions of 
administrators who, in the courts' determination, have 
failed to exercise the discretion granted to them under the 
terms of an ERISA plan. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Ultramar 
Energy Ltd., 70 F.3d 226 (2d Cir . 1995). As we have 
explained, however, we review her e the decision of the 
administrators not under Firestone T ire standards, but 
rather to determine whether there has been a violation of 
the terms of the contract. Therefor e, whatever weight 
Goldstein's arguments on this score might carry in the 
context of a more ordinary ERISA plan, these arguments 
are only relevant in the context of a top hat plan to the 
extent they bear upon compliance with the plan's 
contractual provisions, including the implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
 
In this case, Goldstein's argument that discr etionary 
power was never delegated to the BCC rests on the fact that 
the formal resolution delegating the Pension Committee's 
power to the BCC specifically granted the BCC only the 
authority to "hear and decide claims and appeals." Whether 
the power to "hear and decide claims and appeals" 
necessarily carries with it a discretionary power to interpret 
the terms of the Plan (and it is difficult to see why it would 
not), any technical flaws in the Pension Committee's efforts 
to delegate discretion to the BCC do not bear on the issue 
of good faith. The Plan documents themselves granted the 
Pension Committee the right to delegate its authority, and 
the Committee declared its intention to do so in the 
Summary Plan Description. Additionally, the final 
disposition of Goldstein's claim was made by the Pension 
Committee itself in September 1996. Thus, it cannot be 
said that the delegation to the BCC, and the decision of the 
Pension Committee to adopt its reasoning, somehow 
violated the contractual provisions of the Plan granting the 
Pension Committee the power to interpret the Plan terms, 
or demonstrated any lack of good faith on the part of J&J. 
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As for Goldstein's second argument, that he was denied 
an opportunity to make his case before the BCC, the facts 
simply do not bear him out. He exchanged numer ous 
letters with J&J employees, including the Chair of the BCC, 
in which he was able to explain his interpretation of the 
Plan. In fact, during cross-examination, Goldstein admitted 
that he had, at one time or another, submitted to the BCC 
all of the information he believed it needed to reach a 
determination. Goldstein was informed of the initial BCC 
meeting, but never asked to attend or to submit evidence. 
Finally, as the District Court found, Goldstein's claim was 
reviewed by J&J on at least three separate occasions: 
during the initial meeting of the BCC, during the course of 
Goldstein's exchange of correspondence with Car ey, and 
during the Pension Committee's September 1996 meeting. 
In the face of this evidence, we see no grounds for 
concluding that the District Court's finding of good faith on 
the part of J&J was clearly erroneous.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In a related argument, Goldstein ar gues that no deference is due an 
administrative interpretation of a Plan unless the claimant is given a 
"full and fair review" as requir ed by 29 U.S.C. S 1133(2). Because he was 
not given an opportunity to present evidence and make arguments before 
the determination was reached, he ur ges us to review the terms of the 
Plan de novo. Title 29 U.S.C. S 1133(2) is among those enforcement 
provisions of ERISA from which top hat plans have not been explicitly 
exempted. However, by its terms, S 1133(2) obligates only "named 
fiduciaries" -- which are not required for top hat plans -- to conduct a 
"full and fair review" of a benefits denial. We need not decide today 
whether S 1133(2) applies to the administrators of top hat plans per se, 
or whether a "full and fair review" as defined by S 1133(2) is itself a 
component of good-faith plan administration, because we agree with the 
District Court that such a review was pr ovided to Goldstein in this case. 
J&J wrote to Goldstein with updates on his claim for benefits and fully 
laid out its reasons for denying his claim. It responded to his letters 
and 
invited him to call if he had further questions. It identified the 
specific 
provisions of the Plan pursuant to which it was premising the denial of 
benefits. And, as explained above, Goldstein has been unable to identify 
any "evidence" that he could have submitted that the administrators 
failed to consider. Thus, J&J fully complied with the strictures we 
developed in Grossmuller v. Inter national Union, United Automobile 
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 715 F.2d 853, 
857-58 (3d Cir. 1983), for a full and fair r eview as required by S 
1133(2). 
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In addition to the propriety of the process by which J&J 
reached its decision, there is no inher ent unreasonableness 
in the substantive interpretation of the Plan terms offered 
by J&J giving rise to an inference of bias or bad faith. As 
written, Goldstein's contract discusses his salary and 
bonuses in the same section as the discussion of his right 
to participate in the Plan; his "commissions," in contrast, 
are placed in a separate section, suggesting that the parties 
construed these payments to be something other than 
pensionable earnings. 
 
Further, the contract specifically avers that the 
commissions were intended to replace other forms of 
executive compensation such as CECs. As the District 
Court observed, these forms of executive compensation 
were not pensionable at the time of the execution of 
Goldstein's contract, and only some of them became 
pensionable when they were explicitly added to the list of 
pensionable earnings in 1994. Thus, it is clear that the 
phrase "basic remuneration" did not encompass either 
these alternative forms of compensation, or Goldstein's 
commissions, in 1989, and the fact that these for ms of 
executive compensation had to be explicitly added to the 
list of pensionable earnings in 1994, while the phrase 
"basic remuneration" remained intact, suggests that there 
was no "implied" broadening of the definition of "basic 
remuneration," but instead an expanded list of included 
items. 
 
Additionally, as the District Court concluded, the phrase 
"Covered Compensation includes" is r easonably susceptible 
of meaning either that the earnings listed ar e a "sample" of 
the types of compensation to be included, or that the 
phrase "Covered Compensation" is intended to encompass 
only those forms of compensation explicitly mentioned in 
the list.10 Thus, there is nothing unreasonable in J&J's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We cannot help but observe that Goldstein apparently began offering 
his alternative construction of the phrase"Covered Compensation 
includes" only at the time he filed suit in the District Court, and not 
when he lodged his claim for additional benefits with the Pension 
Committee. This fact alone suggests that J&J's interpretation is, at 
minimum, a reasonable one. 
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interpretation of the Plan to cover only those forms of 
compensation specifically enumerated. And although 
Goldstein plausibly argues that the 1994 deletion from the 
Summary Plan Description of the clause excluding for ms of 
compensation not otherwise specified must be interpreted 
as evincing an intent to alter the Plan from pr oviding an 
exclusive list to providing only a "sample" listing, the 
District Court credited testimony of J&J employees that the 
phrase had been deleted as surplusage, because the intent 
all along was to create a list of "cover ed compensation" 
solely by listing the included items. Certainly, such an 
interpretation of the motivation for the deletion is not 
unreasonable either. 
 
Goldstein's position is not an unsympathetic one, and we 
can understand his anger that, notwithstanding the large 
sums that his thymopentin patent yielded to J&J (and the 
fact that he was brought into J&J for his expertise in 
developing profitable drugs, a skill that might often be 
rewarded by large royalty-like payments), he was 
nonetheless given a pension based merely upon his salary. 
Concomitantly, were we reviewing the plan's terms de novo, 
we might reach a different r esult. After all, the fact that 
Goldstein's employment contract specifies that the salary 
and bonus payments were to be made in lieu of J&J's 
obligation to market Goldstein's products suggests that it 
was the commissions -- and not the salary -- that 
constituted Goldstein's "basic remuneration." But, as the 
Department of Labor has explained, highly-compensated 
employees such as Goldstein are well-placed to form 
employment contracts that protect their inter ests, and in 
this case, the contract expressly grants the Pension 
Committee the power to make final determinations as to 
the types of compensation that are pensionable. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that although courts need not 
defer to the construction of disputed contract ter ms given 
by the administrators of top hat plans, effect must be given 
to all of the terms, including those conferring discretion on 
the administrators (subject as always to the implied duty of 
good faith). In this case, the discretion granted to the 
administrators was quite broad, and ther e is nothing in the 
process by which J&J reached its decision, or in the 
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decision itself, that would lead us to conclude that the 
District Court's determination as to J&J's good faith was 
clearly erroneous. Thus, we conclude that J&J did not 
breach its contractual obligation to Goldstein. The 
judgment of the District Court will be affir med. 
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